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Key Messages 
 
o The Leveson Inquiry should recommend use of a broad range of 
policy instruments to regulate media power and pluralism: not 
just press self-regulation but also those that deal with the root 
cause of media capture of politicians: media ownership and 
concentration 
 
o There is no infallible policy prescription but the approach should 
be holistic; looking at both internal and external plurality of the 
media, and ensuring maximum transparency of ownership for 
citizens and consumers. 
 
o To protect citizens and enhance certainty for industry, fixed 
ownership limits should be (re)-established for media mergers 
and a regular review of the market carried out by an 
independent media regulator to assess media plurality and 
concentration of media power and influence.  
 
o Politicians should play no role in deciding individual cases 
involving media competition or plurality issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
LSE Media Policy Project: Media policy brief 7  
Media Pluralism and Media Power 
 
 
 
 
“I am concerned about the extent to which 
it is appropriate for me to start to opine 
about percentage market shares, because 
that involves all sorts of competition 
issues which would require themselves 
quite detailed analysis.” 
 
Lord Justice Leveson, June 13 2012 
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Introduction 
 
In the UK, the framework for measuring „media plurality‟ came under 
increasing scrutiny in 2011 and 2012. The weakness of the current regulatory 
framework was highlighted when Business Secretary Vince Cable had to 
resign from administering a media plurality test on the proposed News 
Corporation/BSKYB merger in December 2010 and, again, as his 
replacement, Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt faced calls for his resignation 
over the same merger. In a recent report,1 media regulator Ofcom has 
highlighted the inadequacy of the current legislative framework and 
suggested that new rules should deal with threats to media pluralism arising 
not only from proposed mergers but also from the „organic‟ growth of specific 
media companies. Awareness of the difficulty of implementing a framework 
for media mergers has been heightened by the gradual realisation that 
regulators and politicians failed to deal with phone hacking and other illegal 
activities by journalists, because they felt unable or unwilling to challenge 
certain parts of the media.   
 
In framing any new regime we thus 
need to address some fundamental 
questions. Who should decide when a 
merger between two media companies 
operates against the public interest, or 
when one has grown too big? How 
can decisions of this kind be made 
whilst avoiding the risk that politicians 
use merger review as a lever to curry 
favour with the very media owners 
they are supposed to constrain, or that 
the framework itself chills free speech? Such problems are exacerbated by 
the difficulty of defining „media pluralism‟. Numerous experts2 have now 
commented on the complexities of reaching a judgement on what constitutes 
a „sufficient plurality‟ of owners with control of media companies.  
 
An analysis of the post-war media pluralism framework in the UK since the 
1947 Royal Commission on the Press has identified four distinct objectives for 
media plurality regulation:3  
 
 maintaining the integrity of the democratic process;  
 preventing media misrepresentation and suppression of information;  
 enhancing citizen‟s access to diverse information and opinions; and  
 protecting freedom of expression.   
 “Because party leaders were so 
keen to win the support of 
newspapers, we turned a blind 
eye to the need to sort this 
issue, get on top of the bad 
practices, to change the way our 
newspapers are regulated”.   
 
David Cameron, July 2011. 
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But media pluralism is now not only a domestic imperative, recognised in the 
general duties of Ofcom (Communications Act 2003, section 3) and of the 
BBC (BBC Licence Agreement 2006, clauses 9 and 10); it is also considered 
an essential component of media systems in democratic societies by both the 
Council of Europe and European Union, notably in article 11 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
 
During 2012 the Leveson Inquiry will make recommendations to Government 
on media pluralism. Ofcom, which has previously suggested4 reforms are 
necessary, has just reported on the matter, and so will a select committee 
Inquiry. This brief outlines key elements of the current regulatory structure 
and sets out criteria for evaluating existing policies. It then reviews possible 
regulatory techniques and makes proposals for a revised framework for 
protecting media plurality. It argues that we need to establish clear limits on 
media ownership in order to protect the interests of citizens and create 
certainty for industry but that this can only be one part of a much broader 
„holistic‟ approach – one that recognises the interconnectedness of media 
ownership controls with questions relating to competition in media markets, 
media transparency and accountability, press self-regulation, broadcasting 
impartiality, freedom and protection for journalists, and state support for public 
service media and investigative journalism.  
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1. Why Intervene to Protect Media Pluralism? 
 
   
Witnessing the role of the mass media in both supporting and 
undermining democracy during the Second World War, European 
institutions, notably the Council of Europe, and European states have 
sought to put in place constitutional and legal frameworks that both 
protect the media from government manipulation and prevent an 
excessive concentration of media power in private hands.  These 
frameworks characteristically include content requirements, for example, 
to cover a range of views and opinions or to act impartially; disclosure 
and accountability requirements; and structural controls.   
 
This policy brief focuses on structural controls but recognises the 
importance of placing these controls within the broader framework of other 
relevant regulatory initiatives and standards.  In the UK, ownership 
controls have been introduced primarily in order to: 
   
 Enhance content diversity.  In certain markets, enhanced 
competition encourages companies to diversify their product from 
that of their rivals. 
 
 Prevent any one individual or company having excessive media 
power and influence.  With more competitors there is less scope 
for a company to suppress information and dictate the news 
agenda.  This also reduces the scope for the media to exercise an 
undue influence on government policy. 
 
Structural controls can take a variety of forms.  Most countries have 
introduced sector specific limits, which restrict the number of broadcast or 
press interests a given individual or company can accumulate at regional 
or national levels.  An alternative approach is to rely simply on the 
operation of general competition rules, an approach often employed in 
relation to the printed press where there is no technical basis for licensing.  
The UK has increasingly employed a third, „hybrid‟, form of intervention, 
which allows sectoral plurality considerations to be taken into account 
alongside general competition concerns when reviewing certain media 
mergers. 
 
In addition, the UK prevents certain individuals or entities, notably 
advertising agencies, politicians, political bodies and religious institutions, 
from owning certain broadcasting licences because of the potential for 
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conflicts of interest.  In addition, under section 3(3) of the 1990 and 1996 
Broadcasting Acts, Ofcom is required to ensure holders of broadcasting 
licences to be „fit and proper‟ persons.  
 
 
Within Europe it is widely recognised that the media not only need 
protection from government control and influence but that citizens and 
the government may need protection from powerful private media 
companies.  General competition law, which does not directly address 
questions of media plurality, is unlikely on its own to be sufficient. 
 
 
2. Are Controls Still Needed Given the Rise of New Media? 
 
It has frequently been argued that technological changes – such as the 
decline of print, the lowering of barriers to entry in news provision, and the 
rise of an apparently infinite number of news and information websites on 
the internet – render twentieth century media pluralism controls 
redundant5. In the past decade, the UK, the US and other, governments 
have relaxed some of the controls on media ownership, in part on this 
basis. These moves appear premature since media power has proven 
more resilient than expected. Rather than simply come to an end, it has 
changed form:   
 
 Internet delivery of news may have modified, but does not appear to 
have undermined, the influence that mainstream media have over 
opinion formation, rather mainstream media have actively and 
successfully colonised this new arena.6  
 
 Interactive, social media generate new forms of power based on 
closer relationships between prosumers7 and news providers, and a 
more tailored news experience. The ability to control and influence 
public opinion involves knowledge about what consumers expect, use, 
and demand. Companies such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter 
have an unprecedented ability to understand the diffusion of facts and 
opinions, and even link this information to individual subscribers.8. 
 
 The representation and formation of public opinion is no longer a 
simple process of production and dissemination of guiding texts, but a 
more complex interactive process. The representation of what is 
public opinion is itself a strong influence on what is public opinion. 
Development of semantic polling and other tools of monitoring public 
opinion are already deployed by media firms,9 many of whom have 
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privileged access to the data required to monitor traffic and flow of 
opinion. 
 
 
New media technologies mean there are new dimensions of 
„communication power‟ not captured by the traditional regulatory 
frameworks for media pluralism.  Increasing reliance is placed on 
general competition law, which allows some scope to consider 
consumer but not citizens‟ interests.  
 
 
 
2. Setting the Parameters: The Measurement of Media Plurality.  
 
 
Unfortunately there are no simple policy prescriptions for enhancing 
media plurality and, in shrinking markets, policy options may be limited.  In 
framing any future regulatory regime the following considerations do, 
however, need to be taken into account:   
 
Ends and Means 
 
In certain contexts policy trade-offs are required.  In particular, our twin 
goals of content diversity and controlling media power may call for 
incompatible courses of action.  Although a greater number of operators 
can enhance content diversity, there are situations, particularly where the 
market is limited, when a reduction in the number of operators is likely to 
result in more diverse, higher quality, content.10  But concentration 
enhances media power and makes it easier for a media company to avoid 
or misrepresent certain issues for commercial or ideological reasons.  A 
policy decision then needs to be taken as to whether to tailor structural 
rules to promote diversity or control media power.  Depending on the 
choice taken, alternative mechanisms, such as content controls or 
subsidies, may be needed to address the other concern.   
 
Relevant Content 
 
A key decision has to be made whether to consider only news and current 
affairs content or all media content and, if news, whether only national or 
also foreign news services. Because of its democratic importance, Ofcom 
decided in the NewsCorp/BSkyB proposed merger to narrow its focus to 
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news only, with specific reference to providers of domestic news.  It has 
maintained this approach in its recent report to the Secretary of State on 
„Measuring media plurality‟11 Regulation in other European countries has 
tended to focus on media content as a “whole”.12  In Germany, for 
example, the focus is on general audience share of television channels. 
 
The counter argument is that other forms of content, entertainment, 
religious or cultural programmes, for example, can be equally important in 
conveying political and social information and that we require access to 
diversity across all programme genres.  It has been suggested that 
consideration should thus be given to the impact of a transaction on 
„cultural provision serving any group of users or viewers that might be 
significantly affected by it‟.13 There is also a practical problem in focusing 
solely on news and current affairs content in that this creates a 
disincentive for companies to offer news and companies wishing to 
expand may strategically spin-off their news services to avoid control, as 
was proposed by News Corporation in relation to SkyNews.  To address 
these concerns, as a minimum, separate consideration should be 
given to a firm‟s position in the market for news and current affairs 
as well as across all genres.   
 
Relevant firms 
 
Given media convergence it no longer makes sense to focus solely on 
broadcast radio and television services and the printed press.  Online 
providers of media content need to be included in any future regulatory 
scheme.  Aggregators, search engines and other intermediaries that do 
not create specific content services of their own should not at present be 
covered by ownership restrictions but the position should be monitored to 
see whether they start to play a more central role in editorial decisions 
and opinion formation.  Competition law does, however, need to be 
rigorously applied in this field and consideration should be given to 
whether there should be further scope to take media plurality concerns 
into account in this context.  A high level of transparency for consumers 
and other communications operators as to the basis on which information 
is relayed should be guaranteed, and adequate returns ensured for the 
use of third party content.  Some European countries, such as France and 
Spain, have imposed a tax on intermediaries and reinvested the funds in 
original content. 
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Wholesale or retail provision? 
 
The decision regarding what level of a company should be considered is 
also relevant in relation to media markets.  Ofcom has illustrated the 
importance of focusing on news providers at the “wholesale” level, 
meaning that the focus is not on the single “brand” accessed by the 
consumer (for example Sky News or Channel 5), but on the underlying 
news provider (Sky in both cases).  This is because it would be 
misleading to conclude that there is a plural media market where multiple 
services all provide information obtained from a single source.   
Considering the wholesale level provides a more comprehensive 
picture of a news provider‟s influence.  In addition, this approach is 
more appropriate in a converged media market, where distinctions 
between single platforms become blurred. 
 
Relevant indicators14  
 
In evaluating the market for media diversity purposes, the relevant 
consideration, in structural terms, is the number of available outlets in a 
particular market.  The position is, however, more complicated in relation 
to media influence because of the difficulty of establishing robust 
measures of influence.  Subjective assessments are prone to error; 
behaviour modification difficult to evaluate because of causal complexity; 
while proxy measures, such as overall reach and the frequency and 
duration of exposure (taking into account reliance on alternative sources) 
raise specific questions regarding the comparability of data across media 
sectors and platforms. 
 
The Ofcom report on the Public Interest Test15 in the case of the 2010 
NewsCorp/BSkyB merger is a case in point:  Ofcom research combined 
more than a dozen separate dimensions of media plurality and a very 
wide range of separate empirical indicators, looking at news flow across 
platforms, relative influence of different platforms, in addition to a bespoke 
survey looking at „share of references‟ (i.e. subjective reports of news 
sourcing). Despite the rigour of the research, it was criticised from 
numerous directions and had the merger proposal not been withdrawn, it 
is likely that any decision based on the research would have been subject 
to lengthy challenges and appeals. 
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Table 1 below illustrates the respective advantages and disadvantages of 
some of the various metrics of measurement that have been used, or 
proposed, in various European countries.  
 
Table 1: Common Indicators for Media Plurality 
 
These indicators prove particularly useful in the case of cross-media 
mergers, thus potentially becoming even more relevant in a future, 
increasingly converged, media market. Apart from the share of revenues 
measure, they all focus on the consumer side, which represents the 
most effective policy approach to assess media influence over public 
opinion.16 Although revenue proves useful to show the weight of a 
company in a given market, it provides poor evidence of a media outlet‟s 
real capacity to reach (thus influence) citizens.17  
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Share of time exposure is likely to be the best single measurement of 
potential influence, but these findings will be strengthened when other 
forms of assessment such as share of reference and audience reach are 
also taken into account. 
 
None of the indicators listed above is able to directly assess the level of 
multi-sourcing, meaning the average number of sources used by an 
individual on a regular basis. This is data, which should also be taken into 
account, under the assumption that the influence of a single media outlet 
decreases when an individual accesses an increasing number of sources. 
In addition to the indicators listed above, concentration indices – such 
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) - have also been developed 
primarily in the United States, in order to allow competition authorities to 
assess the degree of concentration in specific markets. Normally, these 
markets are calculated in terms of share of revenues, but in the case of 
media companies, markets should be assessed in different terms, such as 
considering share of time exposure.  
 
Applying concentration indices to a media market assessed in this way 
could provide a transparent mechanism to understand the degree of 
media power.18 
 
These indices prove particularly useful in the case of mergers - because 
they allow one to easily evaluate whether a merger would breach a pre-
defined concentration limit – and can be applied as part of a continuous 
review of the media market.19  Still, concentration indices do not exempt 
policymakers from fixing specified limits, otherwise the values obtained by 
applying these indices are simply meaningless. 
 
 
3. Regulatory Strategies in the UK and Abroad 
 
Media ownership rules thus employ various systems of measurement. In 
particular, intervention can be more or less sophisticated and can afford 
more or less discretion to the designated decision maker.  The greater the 
degree of sophistication and discretion involved, the greater the likelihood 
of uncertainty for industry and „agency capture‟.  Some countries have 
sought to avoid these risks by establishing fixed ownership limits.  
Alternatively, thresholds or triggers can be specified that then lead to a 
more extensive examination of the impact of the proposed or actual 
concentration on specified plurality interests.20 The UK currently 
incorporates elements of both these approaches, considered in turn 
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below, but has shifted over time to rely much more heavily on a „holistic‟ 
form of plurality review. 
  
Fixed Limits 
 
Fixed limits establish clear prohibitions on specific concentrations of 
ownership and may be calibrated by reference to the various measures 
discussed above, such as share of audience or revenue, number of 
operating licences etc.  These rules are quite common in Europe. In 
Germany, the concept of Media Pluralism is not mentioned in the 
regulations that apply to the media. Instead, control over opinion-forming 
power is the crucial consideration to be taken into account 
(„meinungsmacht’).  Companies that attract more than 30 per cent of the 
television audience are presumed to exert too great an influence on public 
opinion.21  In Italy, owners are prohibited from obtaining more than 20 per 
cent of revenues derived from a broadly defined media sector, including 
audiovisual distribution services, book publishing and advertising 
agencies. Fixed limits have, until recently, been the preferred means of 
control also in the US, which has tended to favour „bright line regulation‟ to 
limit agency capture. 
 
In the UK most fixed limits have now been abolished.  The sole remaining 
limit prohibits any combination between a company with significant 
interests in national newspapers and the holder of a Channel 3 television 
broadcasting licence.  According to Schedule 14 of the 2003 
Communications Act22:  
 
“A person is not to hold a licence to provide a Channel 3 service if—(a) he 
runs a national newspaper which for the time being has a national market 
share of 20 per cent. or more; or (b) he runs national newspapers which 
for the time being together have a national market share of 20 per cent or 
more.” 
 
Thresholds and Undertakings 
 
The alternative approach is to establish various thresholds or triggers that 
lead to a more in-depth analysis of the impact of a given concentration. 
The UK adopts a trigger, in the form of a proposed merger meeting certain 
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threshold conditions, which can then lead to examination of specified 
media public interests.  These media public interest (MPI) considerations 
are set out in section 58 of the Enterprise Act 200223.  The decision to 
review a relevant merger on the basis of these tests rests with the 
Secretary of State.  The MPI considerations differ depending on the 
medium involved but broadly reflect the concerns to promote diversity and 
prevent undue media power identified above.  For newspaper mergers the 
MPI‟s are: 
 
58(2A) The need for: 
(a) accurate presentation of news; and  
(b) free expression of opinion; 
and 
58(2B) The need for, to the extent that it is reasonable and 
practicable, a sufficient plurality of views in newspapers in each 
market for newspapers in the United Kingdom or a part of the United 
Kingdom... 
 
For broadcasting and newspaper/broadcast mergers the considerations 
are: 
 
58(2C)… 
(a) the need, in relation to every different audience in the United 
Kingdom or in a particular area or locality of the United Kingdom, for 
there to be a sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media 
enterprises serving that audience; 
(b) the need for the availability throughout the United Kingdom of a 
wide range of broadcasting which (taken as a whole) is both of high 
quality and calculated to appeal to a wide variety of tastes and 
interests; and 
(c) the need for persons carrying on media enterprises, and for those 
with control of such enterprises, to have a genuine commitment to the 
attainment in relation to broadcasting of the standards objectives set 
out in section 319 of the Communications Act 2003. 
 
The UK statutory provisions do not themselves indicate how the MPI 
considerations should be assessed in practice and leave wide discretion 
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to elected politicians in the final decision. Recent experience of applying 
this test in the media sector has led to intense debate (and costly market 
uncertainty) about what constitutes a „sufficient plurality of persons‟ with 
control over media enterprises.24 Where newspapers enjoy political 
influence this creates an endemic conflict of interest that undermines the 
legitimacy of the process.   
  
The use of thresholds and undertakings affords media companies the 
possibility of convincing regulators that, whilst a change in media 
ownership appears prima facie a threat to media pluralism, it will not in 
fact operate against the public interest or that any negative consequences 
will be counterbalanced by other advantages.  It may, for example, be 
possible to show that a company, if not taken over, will fail so that allowing 
a merger should at least maintain, rather than reduce, plurality. This was a 
consideration when News Corporation was given permission to buy the 
Sunday Times and Times.25 Alternatively, media companies may be 
allowed to convince the relevant regulator that they can put in place 
reliable safeguards to protect media pluralism, such as independent 
directors or separate newsrooms, so that 
the merger should be permitted.  They 
may also offer „side-payments‟ in the 
form of additional investment in news 
gathering or the transmission of news or 
other forms of under-represented 
content.  The factors that can be taken 
into consideration can be specified with 
more or less precision. 
 
There are problems with affording scope 
for safeguards or „undertakings in lieu‟: 
firstly, the effectiveness of such 
safeguards – for example guarantees of 
editorial independence and non-
executive directors - are often met with 
scepticism, and secondly, the negotiation 
of „undertakings in lieu‟ can itself constitute a threat to media and political 
independence, as was witnessed dramatically in the case of the News 
International/ BSKYB merger decision in 2010-2011. 
 
Our survey of systems employed for measuring media plurality shows that 
media plurality measurement faces a trade-off between certainty 
 The Co-ordinating Committee 
for Media Reform (CCMR) has 
suggested the introduction of a 
15% threshold and 30% limit in 
relation to share of news 
provision at national and 
regional levels.  
 
Where a company exceeds the 
15% limit, consideration would 
be given to the introduction by 
the company of various 
initiatives that could enhance 
media plurality. 
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(justiciability/objectivity) and responsiveness (flexibility/sophistication). 
There is a clear interest in designing predictable, objective outcomes that 
are „above politics‟ yet an opposite interest in flexibility and meaningful 
intervention. Despite the widespread policy experimentation, no country 
has managed to find a satisfactory measurement system. Media plurality 
measurement tends to be subject to appeal and long delays. The level of 
change in the media sector makes the quest for such a methodology less 
likely rather than more likely to succeed26. It is nonetheless possible to set 
out some proposals for reform that draw on experiences in the UK and 
other countries: 
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Conclusions: Elements of a New Policy 
 
Front bench politicians of all parties have now acknowledged that the 
power of News International resulted in corruption and the cover-up of 
illegal practices by UK media in the past two decades. The Leveson 
Inquiry faces the additional challenge of deciding to what extent it 
should give detailed policy prescriptions given that it has also heard 
evidence that politicians may be tempted to compromise on policy in 
order to retain the support of private media. In this context, it is 
essential that Leveson sets out clear principles to govern policy as well 
as some potential options: 
 
The public policy implications of the corruption and 
cover-up exposed by the Leveson Inquiry could be 
approached in a variety of ways. Regulating the 
behaviour of politicians and the press, for example 
by making meetings between them more 
transparent, is part of the solution, as is reform of the 
self–regulatory regime for the press, possibly by 
extending its reach to online content more widely 
and by closely incorporating journalists as well as 
the public in the establishment and enforcement of 
ethical rules. But these are only partial solutions. It is 
necessary to deal with the root causes: 
concentration of media ownership and power. This 
policy brief has shown that there are two kinds of 
potential responses available: structural rules that 
govern the size of media companies and mergers 
between them (external pluralism) and behavioural 
rules that place limits on the use of opinion forming 
power (internal pluralism). Any new policy settlement 
will require a combination of these. 
 
Principles for policy 
 
Regulation should be: 
 
o Precautionary. When regulation of media plurality fails, trust in 
democratic institutions is damaged.  Therefore, prevention should 
be a priority. A precautionary principle, with readiness to intervene 
even where the scale of the risk is difficult to quantify should be 
adopted because of the potentially serious nature of any ensuing 
damage to society. 
Leveson should 
recommend a new 
framework that is: 
 
 Protective:  of citizens’ 
interests, employing a 
precautionary principle  
 Certain: to encourage 
investment in domestic 
journalism, combining 
streamlined merger 
control with periodic 
market review 
 Independent: from 
politicians and industry 
 Justiciable: to create 
trust 
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o Certain. A system that involves too much discretion and a lack of 
clear definitions and agreed measurements is a bad system. The 
time and cost of challenge and judicial review is simply too great, 
potentially leading to harmful disinvestment from the UK media. 
The new system should provide companies and investors with 
clarity to enable long term planning.  
 
o Independent. Any future regulatory body dealing with media 
concentration should be independent from the government and 
from the media. 
 
o Justiciable. To create trust in the system and ensure that the rules 
are applied correctly, without bias, there should be scope for 
judicial review. 
 
External Pluralism: New Limits on Media Ownership 
 
Mergers. The current media ownership controls are too complex, open to 
challenge and place too much discretion in the hands of the relevant 
minister.  We suggest reconsideration of fixed limits, based on metrics 
suited to our converged media environment, leading to a simpler, more 
predictable, merger procedure:  
 
New fixed limits should be established based on share of audience 
exposure to content, both in relation to news/current affairs and content in 
general.27 Fixed limits can improve market certainty and avoid lengthy 
disputes, they are widely employed in other countries.  Mergers would be 
prohibited when the time spent accessing content provided by relevant 
firms exceeds a specified percentage of the audience‟s total exposure 
time.   
 
Limits should be set with a precautionary principle in mind. Further 
research and consultation is required before fixing these limits but a figure 
in the order of 15%-20% of total audience exposure to news and to 
content in general, at the national level, could be appropriate. The 
measurement we suggest relates to the multi-media market, including 
online services. 
 
 Public service media such as the BBC and Channel 4 should be 
included in the assessment to ensure a proper evaluation of the 
market but should not be subject to control because of their extensive 
plurality obligations and degree of insulation from political and 
commercial pressures. 
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 Consideration should be given to applying a similar limit in the context 
of specific media sectors, for instance, radio, given that the style and 
nature of reporting differs across media.  This is also important to 
prevent smaller media sectors being completed dominated by one or a 
few content providers. This limit is proposed for mergers involving 
firms operating at the national level but modified fixed limits could also 
be applied in the different regional markets.  
 
 These limits are absolute, although consideration would need to be 
given to situations involving failing firms. 
 
Organic growth. Here the situation is different in that there is a strong 
argument that firms should not be penalised for their commercial success.  
On the other hand, organic growth can be just as damaging to the public 
interest. We thus suggest a process of periodic (possibly bi-annual) 
market review to be carried out by Ofcom.  Where a firm exceeds the 
specified audience exposure limits for news or content in general, it 
should be open to the firm to establish, using whatever information it 
considers most appropriate, either that media plurality is not at risk; that 
safeguards have been put in place to address potential concerns; or that 
countervailing action has, or will be taken, to compensate for any harmful 
consequences stemming from growth. In order to protect market certainty 
the measures likely to satisfy the regulator should be set out clearly in 
guidance. The Coordinating Committee for Media Reform has set out a 
potential list28. 
 
Ministers should be removed from decisions on mergers and 
undertakings. The final decision should be made by an independent 
media regulatory body such as Ofcom. 
 
Internal Pluralism and other strategies for addressing media power 
The revised proposal for mergers and new audience share limits are a 
necessary but not sufficient intervention to protect media pluralism. 
Without wider reforms even this reform is likely to fail. A range of other 
interventions will help to change the culture of media in the UK.  
 
 New general measures to promote internal pluralism and content 
diversity should be encouraged for all media, using a range of 
incentives, such as subsidies, appropriate tax incentives, and clauses 
of conscience for journalists. In particular, there should be support for 
a variety of ownership, governance and accountability models, such 
as user ownership and trusts. 
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 Transparency of media ownership, control and regulation should be 
paramount. Citizens should be able to know who own the media they 
use and firms should be required to publish such data in a 
comprehensible and accessible form. 
 
Making this Work: Audience Measures and New Sources of Data 
 
The UK does not currently gather enough data to effectively measure the 
various aspect of media plurality. Ofcom could build on its own previous 
extensive research and work conducted by the EU29 to develop 
convincing standards for measuring media plurality and to establish 
guidelines on good practice at the national and European levels.   
 Ofcom should be asked to conduct a study on the data needed to 
provide evidence for audience share across media. 
 Ofcom should be required to advise on the relative merits of various 
time-based measures, including both technical measurement and self-
reporting, and develop a robust method for assessment (potentially 
combining the two).  
 In an increasingly international media environment, ownership needs 
to be transparent not only at the national but also international levels.  
EU support in assisting further co-ordination between domestic 
regulators and providers of data relating to the media could here prove 
useful. 
 
Reforming Regulation 
 
Ofcom should also conduct regular and wide-ranging market reviews of 
media plurality.  These could take place every four years and would cover 
ownership and opinion forming power.   
 These should monitor the media market including online, not the 
legislation as is currently the case. These findings may, however, form 
the basis for regulatory or legislative initiatives. 
 Government should order a separate policy review to support 
journalism at the Local level 
 
In the longer term, because of the changing nature of the media market 
consideration should be given to the creation of a converged, media-
specific, competition regulator.  At present Ofcom has competition powers 
in relation to the services it licences but its powers are limited in relation to 
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online providers.  If such a body were to be created with power to review 
competition issues in the media field more generally and, in particular, to 
take into account plurality considerations, this could address some of the 
concerns relating to the growing power of intermediaries such as search 
engines and news aggregators.  
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